

## Welcome to “Let’s Get Ready to Bundle”

- **Please mute your audio** 😊
- **Upcoming virtual seminars**
  - Thurs. 9/17: Robin Lunge’13 “Making Sausage: Influencing Public Policy & Advocating Change”
  - Wed. 10/14: Prof. David Goodman “Health Care Variation in Europe & Asia: What do we know, and what does it mean?”
- **Symposium**
  - April 7-9, 2016: “Scaling Up: What Happens When You Go Big?”



## Lets Get Ready to Bundle How to Think About Bundled Payments

Friday, August 21, 2015  
12:00 PM - 1:00 PM



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## Presentation Objectives




Evaluate the differences in bundled payment models, their key attributes, and variations in design that will influence bundled payment effectiveness

Review the elements necessary to structure a successful bundled payment arrangement

Discuss ways that bundled payment models can be leveraged to drive change and how you will measure success

## Why Change Is Needed...

### *The Rising Cost of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance*



Source: Kaiser/HRET Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits, 1999-2012

## Why Is Healthcare So Expensive?

*It depends on who you ask...*

Why PROVIDERS Think Healthcare Is So Expensive

Rx

Medical Devices

Patients

Insurance Companies

Trial Lawyers

JAMA. 2013;310(20):2199-2200. doi:10.1001/jama.2013.282135

## Why is Healthcare *Really* So Expensive?

- **Fee-for-service reimbursement**
- **Fragmented care delivery**
- **Administrative burden on providers, payers and patients**



- Population aging, rising rates of chronic disease and co-morbidities, as well as lifestyle factors and personal health choices
- Advances in medical technology
- Tax treatment of health insurance

- **Insurance benefit design**
- **Lack of transparency about cost and quality, limited data to inform consumer choice**

- Consolidation and competition
- High unit prices of medical services
- Medical malpractice and fraud and abuse laws
- Structure and supply of the health professional workforce

"What Is Driving U.S. Health Care Spending?: America's Unsustainable Health Care Cost Growth." Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2012

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## Objectives of Bundles and other Value-Based Payment Models




**Paying for value** through outcome-based payment models that reward care providers for improvements in quality and cost-efficiency

**Transforming the delivery system** to be more accountable for cost, quality and experience outcomes, helping make health care more affordable

**Aligning incentives** across employers, consumers and care providers to achieve the Triple Aim of better health, better care and lower costs

## Bundled Payment in the Accountable Care Continuum



## Episodic Cost Variation is a Significant Driver of Bundles



**CIVHC**  
CENTER FOR IMPROVING VALUE IN HEALTH CARE

Data retrieved from [www.cohealthdata.org](http://www.cohealthdata.org) May 7, 2013. Colorado All Payer Claims Database Knee Replacement static report ([http://www.cohealthdata.org/view/reports/StaticReports/APCD\\_Static\\_Report\\_KneeReplacement\\_MASKED.pdf](http://www.cohealthdata.org/view/reports/StaticReports/APCD_Static_Report_KneeReplacement_MASKED.pdf)). Includes claims data from the eight largest commercial payers in Colorado (large-group fully insured and individual lines of business) and Medicaid claims from 2011 and represent the average payments to facilities for knee replacements. Data has not been adjusted for patient severity of illness.

## Drivers of Bundling Adoption



### Payers

- Support narrow networks and centers of Excellence
- Align provider incentives
- Encourage providers to move toward increased accountability
- Reduce costs and improve quality

### Employers

- Reduce cost & care variability
- Ensure quality and appropriateness of care
- Increase worker productivity

### Providers

- Taking early steps toward population health in the future
- Experiment with risk while sharing in cost savings
- Improve partnership between hospital and physicians
- Increase market share through steerage
- Community recognition, e.g. Center of Excellence

### State & Federal Government

- Aging population (Medicare/ duals)
- Encourage innovation to reduce cost/improve quality (SIM grants active in many states)
- State budget crises
- Using influence and purchase power to drive reform across all populations

**Survey Question**



**Are preparing for bundled payments?**

**Examples of Active Bundled Payment Models**



**Hospital DRG Payment**

- Facility receives a fixed payment for all facility services (excludes physician) provided to a patient during an inpatient hospitalization
- Episode begins upon admission and concludes at discharge

**Transplant Bundles**



- Facility receives a fixed, prospective payment for all professional and facility services associated with a transplant case, including organ acquisition
- Episode typically begins pre-operatively and concludes 12 months following the transplant procedure



**TennCare  
Perinatal Care Bundle**

- Specialist receives a retrospective bonus or pays a penalty (shared risk) if the average episode cost exceeds a percentile threshold above/below the market average

The common element in each of example is a fixed, financial payment or cost target for a specific scope of services.





## Medicare doubles down on Bundles




July 9, 2015, CMS announces “**Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement**” proposed rule, mandating bundles for all eligible hospitals in top 75 MSA’s.

Critics response:  
**“...Medicare’s model would discourage innovation and it could bankrupt innovative providers...”**

Center for Healthcare Quality & Payment Reform, July 13, 2015



## Bundled Payment Features and Limitations



## Variables within a bundled payment model



**Working Definition:** A fixed payment or budget around a defined episode of care that incents providers to improve quality outcomes and lower cost within the episode by standardizing the delivery of care.

### Bundled Payment Variables

Service type	Payer Source	Episode trigger	Episode duration	Service Inclusions	Service exclusions
Prospective Payment	Retrospective Payment	Patient Benefit design	Steerage/ Volume	Guarantee period	Carve-outs
Case mix adjustment	Patient engagement	Treatment Decision Support	Who receives the payment	Specialists included	Downstream cost/gain sharing


In the ongoing CMS BPCI pilot program, providers can choose between four different bundled payment models, each with different levels of inclusion and exclusion, spread across 48 different episodes of care.

## Examples of Joint Replacement Bundles: Medicare



### CMS Proposed Rule: Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement

Risk share is measured and reconciled retrospectively between CMS and the hospital. The surgeon and other care providers are not included in the program. Bundle begins upon admission and continues for 90 days post-discharge.



Bundle Variables	Model Disposition
Hospital at Risk	Yes
Physician/Surgeon at risk	No
Patient Steerage	No
Appropriate Utilization Incentive	No
Hospital/Physician Collaboration Incentive	No
Quality Requirement(s)	Yes

## Examples of Joint Replacement Bundles: Commercial




UnitedHealthcare Total Joint Replacement Center of Excellence  
 Payment to the COE is made prospectively. COE contracts with surgeon and all specialists and establishes reimbursement and risk sharing terms.



Bundle Variables	Model Disposition
Hospital at Risk	Yes
Physician/Surgeon at risk	Yes
Patient Steerage	Yes
Appropriate Utilization Incentive	Yes
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Quality Requirement(s)	Yes

## Bundled Payment Success Story: UnitedHealthcare Clinical Oncology



Results: Measurement between October 2009 and December 2012 across 810 cancer patients resulted in a 34 percent reduction in medical costs for a savings of \$33.36 million.

### Bundled Payment Success Story: UCLA Medical Center Kidney Transplantation





- In 1986, Kaiser Permanente asked UCLA to develop a packaged price encompassing all the costs related to transplantation
- UCLA agreed to work with Kaiser to create the first bundled reimbursement model for kidney transplantation



### Bundled Payment Success Story: UCLA Medical Center Kidney Transplantation



- Bundled pricing model helped UCLA improve the care delivery process
  - Clinical pathways for patients became more consistent and streamlined
  - Encouraged physicians to work together in groups as a highly effective, *integrated delivery system*
- From 1991 to 2008, UCLA was the **only** kidney transplant program in the US to achieve statistically significant better one year graft survival than predicted every single year
- 97% patient satisfaction rate



## References & Suggested Sources



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